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OR SEVERAL years now I have been concerned with the problem of how
one should apply the insights of deconstructive practice to questions ofJL law and justice. This question is far from easy, although many people (in
American legal theory, in particular) have simply assumed that deconstruction
could readily be adapted to political questions and, in particular, to the political
agenda of the left. The problem, however, is that deconstructive techniques do
not seem to support any particular vision of justice; indeed they appear to
preclude the possibility of any stable conception of the just or the good that could
provide the basis for political belief or the authority for political action.
Jacques Derrida’s own statements on the relationship between justice and
deconstruction have proven somewhat unhelpful. In his most extended
discussion of the subject, Derrida insisted simultaneously that (1) justice is
impossible (1990:947-9); (2) justice is not deconstructible (1990: 945); (3) law is
deconstructible (1990:945); (4) the undeconstructibility of justice and the
deconstructibility of law ensure the possibility of deconstruction (1990:945);
and (5) deconstruction is justice (1990:945). Taken together, these statements
yield a contradiction.’
In this essay, I argue for positions developed at greater length elsewhere (see
Balkin, 1990a, 1994). First, I claim that deconstructive analyses can be of no use
to the pursuit of justice unless deconstructive arguments assume the existence of
an alternative which is more just than the one being deconstructed, even if this
alternative is subject to further deconstruction. Second, although all conceptions
are equally deconstructible, not all are equally just. We must therefore not
confuse deconstructability with injustice; our ability to deconstruct a particular
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legal or social conception without more tells us little about its relative justice or
injustice. Third, deconstructive arguments made by human beings are necessarily
partial in their target and limited in their scope. As a result, deconstructive
argument does not necessarily further the interests of justice but is rather a
rhetorical practice that can be used for good or for ill.
Finally, to the extent that deconstructive arguments can be used to criticize law
and society as unjust, they must presume the existence of values that transcend
the positive norms of human law, culture and convention. Because all positive
norms can be deconstructed, the critical use of deconstruction must postulate a
transcendental value of justice. Thus, when we employ deconstruction to discuss
questions of justice, it becomes what I call transcendental deconstruction. This
last conclusion may surprise those devotees of deconstruction who have
assimilated the deconstructionist credo (an oxymoron?) that ’there is nothing
outside of the text’. I argue that there is indeed something ’outside’ - or more
correctly ’beyond’ - the cultural texts and the positive norms that we
deconstruct. This something, and its failure to be adequately captured by our
cultural norms is precisely what makes a deconstructive critique of injustice
possible.
THE NORMATIVE USES OF DECONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT ,
I want to begin with a simple question: why might anyone want to deconstruct
law or legal doctrine? One reason has to do with the pursuit of justice. We might
want to demonstrate that the law or some part of the law is unjust. Alternatively,
we might want to show that the law or some part of the law conceals aspects of
social life that we believe to be important, and that its failure adequately to deal
with these aspects leads to injustice. This is a ’critical’ use of deconstruction in a
very ordinary sense of that word - it involves pointing out that something is
wrong and arguing that it could and should be made better or done better.
It is important to emphasize that legal deconstruction does not have to have a
critical purpose. We need not deconstruct legal and social norms in order to
criticize the injustices of law or suggest how law and society might be improved.
Much literary deconstruction has been devoted to showing the ambiguity,
uncertainty and impenetrability of literary texts. So we might deconstruct legal
texts as if they were literary texts, and for the same reasons. We might also
deconstruct legal texts in order to shake ourselves (and others) out of our
accustomed ways of thinking. We might do this because we wish to criticize
existing ways of thinking or because we believe that this will save us from a future
error or injustice. In that case our purpose is really normative and critical.
Nevertheless, it is possible that we are interested in showing the contingency of
our beliefs for its own sake.
In addition, we might be interested in showing tensions or contradictions
within legal doctrine, but not interested in improving law at all or offering
suggestions about how it could be more just. We might believe that it is
impossible to improve law or society in any way, and we might wish to show the
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futility of all attempts at doing so. We might want to demonstrate that the entire
enterprise of normative legal argument is necessarily incoherent, and that it cannot
be made coherent.2 Finally, we might simply enjoy showing incoherence and
contradiction in social and legal structures; we might find the process of
deconstructing aesthetically pleasing but be wholly unconcerned with whether
our work has any normative consequences. So there are forms of deconstructive
criticism of law that are not ’critical’ in my sense of the word.
Although there are many noncritical uses for deconstructive argument, I
suspect that deconstruction first attracted many legal and political theorists
precisely because they assumed that it could be employed to critique or expose
injustices in existing social and legal institutions. Nevertheless, this belief needs to
be justified, not merely assumed.
Suppose, then, that we seek to use deconstructive argument to critique law and
society for its failure to be fully just. It is by no means clear that deconstruction can
assist us in this task. Because all texts are deconstructible, the fact that a conceptual
scheme is deconstructible cannot by itself be a reason for rejecting it. Both more
and less just conceptions will be equally deconstructible. So we do not yet know
how deconstruction assists a critical project. To answer this question, we must
decide exactly what we hope to accomplish when we deconstruct a conceptual
opposition for a normative purpose.
When we employ deconstruction for a normative purpose, we engage in
deconstructive arguments of rectification or amelioration. In other words, we
argue that the deconstructed text or conceptual scheme is unacceptable, and that
there is a better way of looking at things, even if this conception is in turn subject to
further deconstruction. If we do not make these assumptions, then our
deconstruction can serve no critical function. It becomes nothing more than the
discovery of polysemy and other instabilities of meaning in various conceptual
schemes.
All of this may sound so obvious as to be unworthy of mention. Nevertheless, it
is important to establish how deconstructive argument can serve a useful
normative function. If deconstruction merely discovers instability and incoher-
ence in all texts, then it cannot help us decide that one interpretation is better than
another, or that one conceptual scheme is more just than another. So we must make
a very significant demand of deconstructive practice before we can hope to make a
critical use of deconstructive argument. Indeed, if deconstruction is to be used for
rectification or amelioration, deconstructive arguments must do things other than
what most people expect them to do. In particular, they cannot be employed to
show logical contradiction, semantic incoherence or undecideability.
To see why this is so, let us reexamine what is perhaps the most celebrated
example of a deconstructive argument: Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the
distinction between speech and writing in Of Grammatology (1977). Derrida
argues that speech and writing are special cases of a more general form of ’writing’.
Western philosophers have traditionally assumed that speech is closer to truth or
true meaning than writing, but Derrida argues that this is not necessarily so. Both
speech and writing possess the same features of signification, which are simply
more obvious in the case of writing.
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Derrida uses deconstructive argument to rectify a misconception that he
believes many people have held. He offers a deconstructive argument of
rectification. He overturns a conceptual hierarchy to reveal something about
speech and writing that he claims has been previously overlooked or underappre-
ciated in Western philosophy. He asserts that his is a better way to look at speech
and writing than the traditional way, even though his analysis might be subject to
further deconstruction. He claims that understanding the semiotic commonality
of speech and writing better describes their true nature. If Derrida is not
contending that his deconstruction offers a better way of looking at the relation
between speech and writing, or better describes their most central and important
features, it is hard to understand why he made his argument in the first place. His
account would be no better than those of the authors (Plato, Saussure, Rousseau)
that he criticizes. Thus, he is not merely saying that we might look at speech and
writing as special cases of a more general phenomenon, although we might with
equal justification decide not to. He is saying that we should look at them in this
way. His argument has a normative import precisely because he believes that
there is a better and a worse way to analyze the relationship between writing and
speech.
So conceived, deconstructive arguments of rectification are hardly original
with Derrida. They appear in the work of Freud, Marx and Hegel, and many
other thinkers (see Seung, 1994). Nevertheless, a significant problem remains.
The most familiar accounts of how deconstruction works are not consistent with
the idea of rectification or amelioration. As I shall now show, each of these
accounts proves unacceptable for a critical approach to law.
One view would contend that deconstruction reverses a hierarchy between
conceptual opposites, so that the subordinate term is now more important than
the superordinate term. However, this will simply lead to an opposite
falsification and simplification of the situation. In Derrida’s terms, it would
simply reestablish the error of logocentrism in a different way; hence in Positions
he rejects this interpretation of the deconstruction of the opposition between
speech and writing (1981a: 41-2).
A second possibility would be that deconstruction seeks to efface the
distinction between the two terms of a conceptual opposition. However, this
raises significant problems of its own. We cannot efface the distinction between
speech and writing because they are not in fact identical in all respects. Even after
our deconstruction, speech is still spoken and writing is still written. Thus, we
can only claim that we have effaced the distinction between them if we maintain
that the differences between them are unimportant to their true nature. An
essential property of speech and writing is their semiotic function; an accidental
or inessential property is the fact that they are produced by a voice or with a
pencil. However, this commits Derrida to a distinction between essential and
inessential properties, a distinction he would be unlikely to adopt. Moreover, it
creates a severe irony: we can only justify the effacement of distinctions by
asserting the essential character of other properties and distinguishing them from
accidental properties. Thus, we efface one distinction only to assert another,
necessary one (see Seung, 1994).
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A third approach would argue that deconstruction does not efface the
distinction between two opposed terms, but shows rather that each is inherently
self-contradictory or incoherent. As applied to a text, it would mean that the text
has simultaneously self-contradictory meanings. Thus, our deconstruction of the
opposition of speech and writing would show that the concept of speech as a
self-present form of signification is self-contradictory. A deconstruction of the
Greek word pharmakon (as discussed in Derrida’s essay ’Plato’s Pharmacy’,
1981b) would demonstrate that this word simultaneously means contradictory
things (poison and remedy). However, this interpretation of deconstructive
practice still cannot assist a critical practice. Because all texts are deconstructible,
what can be done to one text can be done to all texts; so all texts will turn out to
have simultaneously contradictory meanings. Furthermore, what can be done to
one side of a conceptual opposition can be done to the other. Hence both sides of
a conceptual opposition will prove self-contradictory and incoherent. Thus, this
account of deconstruction shows not only that slavery is internally incoherent,
but also freedom. It demonstrates not only that the idea of apartheid is
self-contradictory, but also the idea of racial equality.
A fourth interpretation would claim that deconstruction shows the undecidea-
bility of the relationship between opposed terms. As a result, we would say that
we cannot decide whether speech is closer to truth than writing, writing is closer
to truth than speech, or speech and writing are the same thing. We can only
oscillate between these different accounts of their relationship. Alternatively,
deconstruction would show the undecideability of conflicting meanings of a
word. Derrida seems to adopt the idea of undecideability in ’Plato’s Pharmacy’;
he says that we cannot decide whether the word pharmakon means ’remedy’ or
’poison’ (1981 b : 98-9). Nevertheless, the retreat to undecideability is worthless
for a critical practice of deconstruction. Undecideability prevents us from calling
unjust practices to account, or distinguishing them from just ones. Consider the
distinction between apartheid and racial equality. To deconstruct this opposition
would mean that we cannot decide whether apartheid is better than racial
equality, racial equality is better than apartheid, or racial equality and apartheid
are the same thing.
So far, none of the ways of understanding what deconstruction does to a
conceptual schema have proved suitable for social or legal critique. Unfortu-
nately, these are the most common interpretations of what deconstruction
accomplishes: most people have assumed that deconstruction does show the
incoherence or internal inconsistency of conceptual schemes, effaces semantic
distinctions, or demonstrates the undecideability of competing interpretations. If
so, then we must conclude that deconstruction cannot serve the purpose of
rectification or amelioration; it can be of no use to a critical legal or social theory.
There is, however, a fifth account of what deconstructive argument ac-
complishes. It is the version of deconstructive practice I have advocated in my
own writings. It is a version of deconstructive practice specifically designed to be
used in a critical theory of law and society. I argue that one deconstructs a
conceptual opposition by showing that it is actually a nested opposition (Balkin,
1990b). A nested opposition is a conceptual opposition in which the two terms
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‘contain’ each other; that is, they possess simultaneous relationships of difference
and similarity which are manifested as we consider them in different contexts of
judgment. For example, one term may, in certain contexts, be similar to the
other, a special case of the other, logically or practically dependent upon the
other, or develop into a form or variant of the other as history progresses. The
basic deconstructive point is that all conceptual oppositions can be understood as
some form of nested opposition, and that there are often interesting insights to be
gained from such a reinterpretation. Hence, deconstructive argument becomes
the careful and patient analysis of the grounds of similarity and difference
between conceptual oppositions in shifting historical and practical contexts of
judgment. It does not dogmatically assert either the essential nature, the
effacement, or the undecideability of all conceptual oppositions. Rather, it
attempts to discover how conceptual oppositions are related to the contexts that
give them force and meaning.
Thus, Derrida’s argument about speech and writing can be restated in terms of
the theory of nested oppositions. We attempt to see how speech and writing are
mutually differentiated and mutually dependent, how they bear relationships of
similarity and difference in different contexts of judgment. They are similar in
that both have a semiotic function. But their differences reemerge when we look
at them in a different way. The goal of the deconstruction is to reveal the
contextual nature of practical and theoretical judgment, and to critique
acontextual or categorical judgments for their lack of sensitivity to context.
Let us return to the example of the opposition between apartheid or Jim Crow
on the one hand, and racial equality on the other. To analyze this opposition as a
nested opposition, we might ask whether there are features of apartheid that have
unexpected commonalities with particular theories of racial equality, and
whether discovery of these similarities can assist our legal and social critiques.
Hence we might want to ask the following questions.
First, does the pursuit of racial equality permit or even require, in some
circumstances and contexts, racial preferences, or other government distinctions
based on race? For example, in the United States, is the pursuit of racial equality
consistent with the continued existence of historically black colleges, and does it
require race conscious affirmative action programs? If the answer to these
questions is yes, then we have discovered a ground of similarity between the two
sides of this conceptual opposition. But this does not mean that there is no
difference at all between apartheid and the pursuit of racial equality. Our goal is
not to efface the distinction between them, but rather to discover appropriate
ways of thinking about their similarities and their differences. Thus, what
differentiates a system of apartheid or Jim Crow from the pursuit of racial
equality may not be the presence of racial distinctions in public decision making,
but something else - for example, the presence of racial subordination, or the
state’s decision to replicate or foster private beliefs about white supremacy and
black inferiority. The goal of this analysis is to change our view of the real issues
involved, by discovering relevant grounds of similarity and difference. Such an
analysis, in turn, will lead to new concepts, categories and distinctions that can be
further deconstructed.
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Second, do some theories of racial equality, in practice, lead to or maintain the
sort of unjust racial separation and subordination we ordinarily associate with
apartheid or Jim Crow? For example, do certain theories of racial equality (for
example, purely formal theories of colorblindness or theories which restrict
actionable discrimination to intentional racial animus) produce or perpetuate
residential racial segregation and differential access to education, jobs, status and
other social goods? In other words, do some conceptions of racial equality
produce or maintain racial subordination by other means? If so, then they have
important similarities to systems of apartheid, and these similarities can serve as
the basis of a critique. Here the goal of the deconstruction is to discover hidden
(and sometimes embarrassing) connections between practices which go by
different names. , 
~ 
_
DECONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT AS A RHETORICAL PRACTICE
This example shows that the deconstruction of conceptual oppositions is by no
means a scientific or algorithmic process. It is informed by the values and
commitments of the individual deconstructor, and the directions she chooses to
investigate. The above discussion was informed by a set of egalitarian
assumptions about race that most people would describe as ’to the left’. A person
with a different politics might ask very different questions, and discover very
different things through a deconstructive analysis. For example, a conservative
opponent of affirmative action might argue that there are greater similarities
between egalitarian policies and apartheid or the Nuremburg Laws in Nazi
Germany than the left wants to admit. So the target of deconstruction, and the
way that the particular deconstructive argument is wielded, may vary with the
moral and political commitments of the deconstructor.
There are several reasons for this result. First, when people deconstruct texts,
they select certain texts and aspects of texts to critique while leaving others
untouched. Thus, Jacques Derrida has used deconstruction to attack apartheid
and to defend Paul de Man from what he believes to be unjust criticism (Derrida,
1985, 1989). He has not used deconstruction to attack Paul de Man and defend
apartheid. However, there is nothing in the nature of the deconstructive
techniques of reading that Derrida employs that prevents this. It is simply that he
has particular reasons for deconstructing some texts and positions, and leaving
others alone. These reasons may have much to do with the deconstructor’s
preexisting moral and political commitments, even though these may, in turn, be
altered through the process of deconstruction.
Second, although deconstructive analysis is potentially endless, our own
deconstructive arguments must come to an end at some point. We cease
deconstructing when we feel that we have achieved sufficient enlightenment
from the text or conceptual scheme we have deconstructed. This choice of when
to stop may also be informed by our moral and political commitments, although
once again these may be changed through the process of deconstruction.
Thus, each deconstructive argument must be understood in terms of its
 at Yale University Library on October 16, 2010sls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
400
partiality and selectivity. The human practice of deconstructive argument is
always framed and limited both by what it chooses to deconstruct and what it
chooses to leave unexamined; both by where it begins its critique and where it
ends its analysis.
Although this selectivity may be shaped by personal interest or ideology, it is
largely driven by practical necessity. We do not have infinite time to pursue our
deconstructive analyses; hence we must begin somewhere and end somewhere.
Although our deconstructive arguments destabilize distinctions and conceptual
oppositions, they themselves must rely on distinctions and conceptual
oppositions, otherwise they could not be expressed in language and understood by
others. Thus, no deconstructive argument destabilizes all of the conceptual
structures in language or culture at once; for every distinction it deconstructs it
leaves unexamined thousands more.
The inherent partiality and limitations of human deconstructive practice explain
why deconstructive arguments can be used for many different political and moral
purposes. In this sense deconstructive argument shares much in common with
rhetoric. As Aristotle (1991 : Book I, sec. 4, at 1355a) pointed out, the orator always
takes large portions of her audience’s beliefs for granted and does not try to contest
them. Instead, she focuses on specific questions and makes use of beliefs and
attitudes that she and her audience hold in common. Some of these beliefs may be
only partially correct, while others may even be the result of unthinking
acceptance of community norms. Nevertheless, the advocate refrains from
attacking them, because they actually assist her in making her argument.
Because our limited deconstructive arguments are forms of rhetoric, the ethics
of deconstruction become very similar to the ethics of rhetoric generally. Derrida
himself has scoffed at the idea that deconstruction can be used for an evil or unjust
purpose (1989: 827); but it does not take very much effort to show that
deconstructive arguments about justice can be offered in opposing directions (for
examples see Balkin, 1990a, 1994). This is hardly surprising, once we understand
deconstructive argument as a form of rhetoric.
The charge levelled against rhetoric has always been that, because it can serve
both good and bad purposes, it can be used to mislead people, to induce evil courses
of action, or to justify wicked things. Nevertheless, we might defend
deconstructive argument in the same way that Aristotle defended rhetoric
generally: although deconstructive argument can be used for good or for ill, this
does not mean that it cannot be a useful part of public life. It simply means that each
of us becomes responsible for the ways in which he or she uses deconstructive
argument. The limited and partial use of deconstructive argument available to
human intelligence will not lead us inexorably to justice. Nevertheless, used
rightly, it can assist us in our critical endeavors.
DECONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL VALUE OF
JUSTICE
So far I have stressed that deconstructive arguments are always limited encounters
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with the many potentially deconstructible features of law, language and culture.
That is why the human practice of deconstructive argument is a rhetorical
practice. We might put this point another way: let us call the deconstructibility
of human law, language, and culture ’Deconstruction’. So expressed, ’Decon-
struction’ is not a method or a set of beliefs, but rather a fact about or feature of
human culture. Then we might say that the rhetorical practice of deconstructive
argument is a limited use of Deconstruction. It is not identical with Decon-
struction, but is rather made possible by Deconstruction.
The rhetorical practice of deconstruction is made possible by the deconstruc-
tibility of human law, convention and culture. However, what makes a critical
deconstruction of human law, convention and culture possible? I shall argue
that our belief that human law, convention and culture can be deconstructed for
normative purposes must rest on the assumption of transcendental human
values - and, in particular, a transcendental value of justice.
We deconstruct law for critical purposes because of a perceived inadequation
between law and justice - because we seek a justice as yet unrealized in law.
Thus, our deconstruction of law assumes a conceptional opposition between
law and justice. However, deconstruction asks us to reconceptualize every
conceptual opposition as a nested opposition. When we reconceptualize the
opposition between law and justice as a nested opposition, we discover that
there is in fact a complex relationship of mutual dependence and differentiation
between the two.
Laws apportion responsibility, create rights and duties, and provide rules for
conduct and social ordering. But law can never achieve perfect justice. Law is
always, to some extent and to some degree, unjust. At the same time, our
notion of justice can only be articulated and enforced through human laws and
conventions. We may have a notion of a justice that always escapes law and
convention, but the only tools we have to express and enforce our idea are
human laws and human conventions. Our conception of the just relies for its
articulation and enforcement on the imperfect laws, conventions and cultural
norms from which it must always be distinguished.
So we come to this conclusion: human law, culture, and convention are never
perfectly just, but justice needs human law, culture and convention to be
articulated and enforced. There is a fundamental inadequation between our
sense of justice and the products of culture, but we can only express this
inadequation through the cultural means at our disposal.
This nested opposition between law and justice takes us in unexpected
directions. If human legal creations are always to some degree unjust, then
justice cannot be fully determined by any positive norms of human law, culture
or convention, for these positive norms must also fall short of our value of
justice. We must think of our value of justice as an insatiable demand that can
never be fulfilled by human law. In short, we must postulate a human value of
justice which transcends each and every example of justice in human law,
culture and convention. In this way our deconstructive argument brings us to a
transcendental value of justice. Thus, the normative use of deconstruction
becomes what I call ’transcendental’ deconstruction, because it must presume
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the existence of transcendental human values articulated in culture but never
adequately captured by culture.
The idea of ’transcendental’ values is traditionally associated with Plato and his
theory of Forms. However, the transcendental value of justice is quite different
from the Form of justice celebrated in the Republic. We are not concerned here
with an Idea of determinate content that exists separate and apart from human
law, culture and convention. Rather, we are speaking of an insatiable yearning or
longing for justice lodged in the human heart. The value of justice is an aspect of
the inexhaustible human urge to evaluate, an urge that can never be fully
articulated by the positive norms of human culture. So our transcendent value of
justice is not a determinate model that human law strives but fails to copy. It is an
inchoate, indeterminate and indefinite drive that acts as a goad rather than as a
guide. To act justly we do not copy a fixed prototype of the just or measure our
actions by a determinate standard of justice; instead, we must construct just
institutions in response to the inchoate and indefinite demand of justice. Hence,
our laws are imperfect not because they are bad copies of a determinate Form of
justice, but because we must articulate our insatiable longing for justice in
concrete institutions, and our constructions can never be identical with the
longings which inspire them.3 3
We can now connect this argument with the earlier distinction we made
between the rhetorical practice of deconstruction and Deconstruction itself. The
transcendental conception of deconstruction assumes an essential inadequation
between human values like justice and their articulations in human law, culture
and convention. This inadequation between culture and value is Deconstruction
itself. It is what makes human law, language and culture deconstructible. The
rhetorical practice of deconstructive argument makes use of and demonstrates
this inadequation in legal and social conceptions. Thus, to deconstruct a legal or
social conception is to show, in a limited way, that it partakes in the fundamental
chasm between transcendental human values and positive human culture. This
rhetorical use of Deconstruction is always and necessarily partial and incomplete.
Just as human law cannot be equated with justice, neither can the rhetorical
practice of deconstructive argument be identified with Deconstruction itself.
We now see how Derrida’s mystical pronouncements about the relationship
between deconstruction and justice are both appropriate and mistaken. Derrida
argues that justice is an infinite demand, and that the experience of justice is an
experience of the impossible (Derrida, 1990: 947-9). So we have argued: because
justice is a transcendent human value, it can never be fully realized in positive law.
The deficiency between law and justice is a special case of the fundamental
inadequation between value and culture, a gap or chasm we have called
Deconstruction.
On the other hand, Derrida is quite wrong to equate Deconstruction with this
impossible value of justice. To be sure, human beings cannot fully articulate the
inadequation between law and justice in their deconstructive arguments, so the
rhetorical practice of deconstruction is necessarily limited; it cannot be identical
to Deconstruction itself. Yet Deconstruction itself is not impossible; it is the very
predicament of human culture.
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Although Derrida might like to demonstrate the inherent worth of Decon-
struction by identifying it with justice (1990: 945), Deconstruction and justice are
by no means the same thing. Juctice is a transcendent value lodged in the human
heart, an incurable longing that demands articulation in human culture but is
never satisfied by its products. Deconstruction, on the other hand, is a sort of
interval between this indeterminate longing and its partial and imperfect
realizations in human culture. Deconstruction is not justice, and deconstructive
argument is not necessarily just. Indeed, deconstructive theory reminds us that
the pursuit of justice is neverending. Nevertheless, as I have tried to show in this
essay, deconstructive arguments, properly understood and employed, can form
part of a critical theory of law and society. Deconstructive practice can escape the
abyss of normative nihilism if it becomes transcendental deconstruction; so
conceived, it can assist us in the pursuit of the just.
NoTEs 
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My thanks to Sandy Levinson and Austin Sarat for their comments on previous drafts of
this article, and to Tom Seung, who has greatly influenced the ideas presented here.
1. Because deconstruction is justice, and because justice is impossible, deconstruction
is impossible. However, the undeconstructibility of justice and the deconstructibi-
lity of law make deconstruction possible. Hence deconstruction is both possible
and impossible.
2. For example, Pierre Schlag has argued that deconstruction should be understood in
this way, and has specifically attacked the sort of critical employment of
deconstruction I advocate here (see Schlag, 1990).
3. These points are developed more fully in Balkin (1994). See also Seung (1990).
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